The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal David Carleton, Lafayette College Michael Stohl, Purdue University In a recent study, David Cingranelli and Thomas Pasquarello (1985) discovered a modest positive relationship between certain types of U.S. foreign assistance and human rights behavior. We believe a number of factors raise concerns over the validity of these results. Following some discussion, a brief and simplified reanalysis is presented, which varies the cases, economic data, and human rights measures employed by Cingranelli and Pasquarello. This reanalysis highlights a lack of robustness in the original results. We conclude with a brief plea for more judgment and diversity in the design of quantitative work on human rights.
The motives that lie behind U.S. decisions regarding the distribution of foreign assistance have long been a source of extensive speculation and, less frequently, serious systematic analysis. Since Congress reintroduced human rights concerns into U.S. foreign policy in the mid-1970s, a number of observers have attempted to determine the extent to which these concerns influence the distribution of U.S. aid.' Most analysts have concluded that, at best, there is no statistical relationship between human 'It took Congress several years and repeated efforts to reintroduce human rights into U.S. foreign policy. Alarmed by the essentially amoral character of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy, the Congress took its first steps in this regard in 1973. The "sense of Congress" that aid should be tied to human rights behavior was first expressed in Sec. 32 of the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-189, 87 Stat. 714, 733 (1973) , and was strengthened by Sec. 502B of the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-559, 88 Stat., 1815 (1974 (amended 1976) . These provisions were not binding on the executive, however, and were essentially ignored. Congress then took steps to make the link between aid and rights legally binding. Binding language was included in both the 1975 International Development and Food Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 94-161, Sec. 310, 89 Stat. 899, 860 (1975) and the 502B amendment to the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, S. 2662, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 122 Cong. Rec. 9581, 9587-88 (1976) . After an original veto, President Ford signed a compromise in early 1976 that replaced the "sense of Congress" language with a passage that noted that the linkage between aid and rights was "the policy of the United States" (International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 , Pub. L. No. 94-329, Sec. 301 [a], 90 Stat. 729, 748 [1976 ). While strengthened still further in subsequent years, from this point on the link between U.S. foreign assistance and "gross violations of internationally recognized human rights" has been legally mandated. On the development of this legislative package, see R. Cohen (1979) and S. Cohen (1982) . rights behavior and the amount of aid received and, at worst, that there is a significant negative relationship; that is, the more abusive a regime, the more aid received (see Chomsky, 1978; Schoultz, 1981 Schoultz, a, 1981 Falk, 1981; Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson, 1984; Stohl, 1985, 1986 ). In the August 1985 issue of the American Journal of Political Science, however, David Cingranelli and Thomas Pasquarello examined Latin American data from the early 1980s and concluded that there is a positive (if modest) relationship between foreign assistance and would-be aid recipients (Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 1985) . The authors should certainly be commended for their effort to examine systematically an important and complex issue, but we feel their analysis raises a number of concerns that place their results in doubt. Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) present an analysis of the distribution of U.S. economic and military assistance to 30 Latin American and Caribbean nations in fiscal year 1982. The innovative aspect of their research is that they examine the distribution of assistance in each of two decision-making stages. They first examine the impact of human rights at the "gatekeeping" stage, where decisions are made over which countries will receive some aid. Second, they examine the impact of human rights on decisions regarding the "level" of aid distributed to those countries that successfully pass through the gatekeeping stage. Thus, they examine the impact of human rights concerns in four conceptually distinct areas: the distribution of both economic and military aid at each of the two decision-making stages.
Utilizing log-linear and multivariate regression analyses, they conclude that human rights are positively related to foreign assistance in two of these four areas. At the gatekeeping stage, they find that human rights are unrelated to economic aid and conclude that these decisions are made more on the basis of economic need (p. 553).2 In contrast, they find that human rights concerns are much more salient in gatekeeping decisions vis-a-vis military aid. While relatively weak, a positive relationship is discovered between human rights and decisions over whether or not a nation would receive any military aid (without regard to the level or amount of such aid).
In the second stage of their analysis, when only those nations that 2MoSt U.S. human rights legislation contains a loophole that allows for the continued distribution of aid to abusive regimes if it will directly benefit needy people. This economic need language was included in the original (Harkin) amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 , PL 94-161, Sec. 310, in 1973 . The language was later strengthened and specified in the 1977 authorization for the Food for Peace program, PL 95-88, Sec. 111 (a). On both the legislative development and executive interpretation of this loophole, see Schoultz (1981 a). received at least some aid were analyzed, the results were reversed. The level of economic aid was strongly associated with human rights, but the level of military aid was not significantly related.
Thus, the two areas in which Cingranelli and Pasquarello discover results that differ from the bulk of existing research on this issue are: (1) military aid is found to be positively but modestly related to human rights concerns at the gatekeeping stage and (2) economic aid is found to be strongly associated with human rights at the second decisionmaking stage. The remainder of this paper will deal particularly with the latter relationship, the area in which the strongest positive association was discovered.
We have no argument with Cingranelli and Pasquarello's basic premise that it is important to examine the role of human rights concerns at each of the various stages in the foreign policy decision-making process. Recognition of these distinct stages represents a significant contribution to existing work on the issue. We do have several concerns, however, with aspects of the research design and the operationalization of measures, particularly of human rights behavior. We shall proceed to these concerns in three broad steps: (1) a discussion of the manner in which Cingranelli and Pasquarello measure human rights performance; (2) a discussion of their case selection; and (3) the presentation of a brief reanalysis to examine the impact of different measures and sets of cases.
Measuring Human Rights
Devising means to measure human rights adequately is at once extremely difficult and unquestionably needed. If we wish to move the analysis of human rights beyond the normative stage of simply condemning regimes as morally unacceptable, and begin to examine both the causes and effects of human rights abuses, better measurement efforts are essential. Cingranelli and Pasquarello's work clearly represents a step in the proper direction and should be appreciated as such. They employ the 1979 and 1980 human rights reports of the U.S. State Department to scale countries on their level of respect for the integrity of the person and for basic civil and political rights. To do this, they ranked each country on 15 different human rights dimensions and employed factor analysis to generate two factors: one associated with the integrity of the person, the other with civil and political rights. Factor scores were then utilized as the measures of human rights. In addition, these two measures were then combined into a third cumulative human rights measure.
We also have utilized the reports of the State Department to measure human rights in nearly 60 countries for each of the eight years from 1976 through 1983. We have, in addition, constructed a parallel scale utilizing the information in the annual reports of Amnesty International. The techniques used in constructing these scales have been reported in detail elsewhere (Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson, 1984; Carleton and Stohl, 1985; Mitchell et al., 1986) . In addition, alternative scales are available from Freedom House (1980) and Charles Humana (1984) . In short, we have several sets of human rights data available to compare to that developed by Cingranelli and Pasquarello.3 We were disappointed with the lack of clarity and detail with which Cingranelli and Pasquarello discussed their measurement scheme. For instance, in the article as presented in AJPS, the reader is left knowing nothing about how the original 15 dimensions of human rights were coded.4 In a field where empirical measurement is so sparse, and particularly in a study that emphasizes its unique contribution in this area, the manner in which the human rights measures were constructed should have been addressed in far greater detail. Such basic information is necessary to allow concerned scholars to evaluate adequately and improve upon existing measures.
On a more positive note, however, when we correlated' the three scales constructed by Cingranelli and Pasquarello with our own scales based on State Department and Amnesty International information, as well as the civil and political rights scales of the Freedom House organization, they were all significantly related in the expected direction.6 3Cingranelli and Pasquarello (p. 541) state: "To our knowledge, this is also the first study which measures the human rights practices of nations at more than a single point in time." Thus, at the time of publication, they appear unaware of both our data set, as well as the work of Duff and McCamant (1976) . In addition, of course, they also appear to discount the yearly Freedom House ratings, which have now been available for over a decade. Each of these sets of data have their shortcomings (see McCamant, 1981; Scoble and Wiseberg, 1981; Mitchell et al., 1986; Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson, 1986) , but discussion of the problems associated with competing approaches is necessary to improve the current state of measurement. 4 It is important to note that the two did offer to send copies of their coding sheets to anyone who requested them, which they were kind enough to do in our case. And receipt of the coding sheets did answer many of our questions regarding their coding techniques.
5We present Spearman rank-order correlations because we feel they are more appropriate for data of this level of quality and measurement (both of which are low). Nevertheless, we have calculated Pearson correlations as well, and they provide virtually identical results.
6The Freedom House scales have been severely criticized for both exhibiting bias and for a lack of specificity and rigorousness in construction (see McCamant, 198 1; Scoble and Wiseberg, 1981) . These criticisms are well grounded. We utilize the scales, nevertheless, because regardless of their shortcomings they do represent the most ambitious effort to assess human rights behavior to date, and, in addition, they retain tremendous respect among U.S. public officials. The results are presented in Table 1 .7 All of the correlations are significant at the .025 level or better. Most important, our own scale based on the State Department reports is very highly correlated with those of Cingranelli and Pasquarello, which utilize the same information source. Thus, it appears that both provide an essentially accurate reflection of those reports. It is important to note, however, that the correlations between Cingranelli and Pasquarello's human rights scales and that based on the reports of Amnesty International, as well as both Freedom House scales, are considerably smaller. Evidently, there are differences in the human rights "realities" depicted by these scales. This brings us to our principal source of disagreement with the manner in which Cingranelli and Pasquarello measured human rights: their sole reliance on the State Department reports for information. 70n Cingranelli and Pasquarello's scales, more abusive regimes received lower numbers, while on all the rest they received higher numbers. Negative correlations would thus denote agreement. Since this might lead to some confusion, at least for the casual reader, the signs for the non-Cingranelli and Pasquarello measures have been reversed. Cingranelli and Pasquarello assert that the State Department reports "are widely respected" (p. 549), but a wide range of independent human rights monitoring organizations have consistently found substantial fault with the reports. The political biases evident in the reports have been documented in recent years in joint reports issued by Americas Watch, Helsinki Watch, and the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights (1984, 1985, 1986) . Moreover, many of the country reports singled out as exhibiting bias are found in the very sample that is under study (specifically, Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua).
Given the biases evident in the State Department reports, two responses are possible. The first is one of concern, and an emphasis on ensuring that the political biases evident in the reports do not significantly skew empirical results. This is our preferred response, and thus, in our own work we have attempted to minimize the impact of biases by utilizing a variety of measures. We have utilized a State Departmentbased scale, an Amnesty International-based scale, and the Freedom House scales in an attempt to ensure that our results have not been skewed by political biases, or that they are not in effect "sample bound." Rather than combine different perceptions of reality, we have chosen to repeat analyses with each scale and to examine the implications of each. This is obviously not the only or inherently correct manner in which to deal with the problem, but simply one of several possible options. The point, we feel, is that at least some steps of this kind are necessary to minimize the impact of bias in the measurement of human rights.
Alternatively, of course, one could be unconcerned about bias in this instance. Cingranelli and Pasquarello, after all, are concerned with U.S. decision makers. If these decision makers rely on the State Department reports for their information, the reports are the appropriate focus of our attention, even if they bear little relation to human rights reality.
Again, we find the former argument far more compelling. While the State Department reports are no doubt employed by U.S. decision makers, there is really no reason to believe that they represent the only information utilized. Reports on human rights behavior in Latin America are routinely issued by a variety of nonpartisan organizations, and representatives of these organizations (particularly Freedom House and Americas Watch) regularly testify before relevant congressional committees.
In any case, the approach we are recommending does not preclude examining the State Department reports. We are not arguing in favor of supplanting a sole focus on State Department-based scales with a sole focus on Amnesty International-based scales. Rather, the various scales should be examined side by side. It is important for us to recognize that the lack of reliable information represents the chief impediment to adequate human rights measurement. At this point, we have little choice but to utilize various imperfect sources of information. As a result, however, we feel it is incumbent upon us to take steps to minimize the effects of the various inadequacies of available sources. Cingranelli and Pasquarello's measurement scheme would thus be improved by either utilizing multiple sources of information or through the creation of parallel scales for each of several sources of information.8
Case Selection
Our concern with regard to case selection is rooted in Cingranelli and Pasquarello's expressed interest in routine foreign aid decisions (p. 545). On the basis of this desire, they choose to exclude El Salvador from their statistical analysis. Decisions regarding assistance to El Salvador in recent years, and particularly in 1982, the first year in which the Reagan administration was making these decisions, have indeed been anything but routine. They thus conclude that the inclusion of El Salvador would skew their results. Unfortunately, they fail to apply the same logic to what we consider other equally nonroutine cases in 1982. Utilizing the same rationale, we feel that Nicaragua, Honduras, and Jamaica should also be excluded from the analysis, particularly as regards the distribution of economic assistance. Table 2 demonstrates the extent to which the distribution of economic aid to these four countries in 1982 was in fact nonroutine. We can see that economic aid to each of these countries changed dramatically between 1981 and 1982. Quite clearly, the changes in regard to El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras are intimately intertwined. They are all due to the U.S. government's perception of Soviet expansion in Central America as a serious threat to U.S. interests, however defined. Decisions regarding aid distribution in these three countries are, as a result, equally nonroutine.
We feel the dramatic change in economic aid to Jamaica may also be explained by reference to peculiarities of the early 1980s, and particularly of 1982. In brief, the Reagan administration was not shy in its embrace of the Seaga government. It saw Seaga's defeat of Michael Manley in 1980 as an important victory of conservatism over socialist ideology, and they were committed to doing what they could to ensure that the new government was successful. Seaga was the first foreign 8It appears that Cingranelli essentially agrees. In a more recent paper (Cingranelli, 1985) , he outlines a research design which utilizes both the State Department and Amnesty International reports in measuring human rights. head of state invited to the Reagan White House, and administration spokespersons repeatedly stated their desire to turn Jamaica into a "conservative showplace" in the Caribbean. Thus, we feel that aid decisions regarding Jamaica in 1982 cannot be considered routine, and, if that is the criteria for inclusion, Jamaica should be dropped from the analysis.
Unfortunately, no consensus exists at present over the proper manner in which deviant or nonroutine cases should be handled in statistical analyses. Reasonable arguments can be made both for and against the exclusion of outliers. The argument in favor of doing so is persuasively made by Cingranelli and Pasquarello; they are interested in the "general pattern" of U.S. decisions, not the impact of a few atypical cases. The existence of a small number of outliers may easily skew and confuse results. The argument opposed to this approach focuses on the "ad hoc" nature of such case exclusions. When we lack a theoretically grounded exclusion rule, it is easy to fall into the trap of simply excluding those cases that do not support the model under examination. In the extreme this can lead to nonfalsifiable and largely meaningless results. We will not attempt to resolve this conflict here; each position has some merit. The point we are interested in making, however, is that, regardless of which approach is taken, nonroutine cases should at least be treated similarly: either they should all be retained, or all excluded. We do not feel it was appropriate for Cingranelli and Pasquarello to have excluded one nonroutine case and to retain others. It is not clear that El Salvador differs either quantitatively (see Table 1 ) or qualitatively from the other nonroutine cases and, thus, warrants special treatment. We feel that the decision to treat the nonroutine cases differentially (which was almost certainly unintentional), by attenuating and thereby prejudicing the sample, increased the likelihood that evidence supporting the hypothesis that human rights concerns positively affect aid decisions would be found. El Salvador, with a poor human rights score and relatively high aid, was excluded. Honduras and Jamaica, with relatively good State Department human rights scores and high levels of aid, were retained. Further, Nicaragua, with a very bad State Department human rights score and low aid, was also retained. Thus, the one nonroutine case that would skew the results toward a rejection of the hypothesis was excluded, while the three nonroutine cases that would skew the results toward an acceptance of the hypothesis were included. In light of this, a reanalysis of the data seems warranted.
A Reanalysis
We do not present an exact replication of Cingranelli and Pasquarello's entire analysis. Rather, we shall focus on one portion of their analysis: the distribution of economic aid at the second or "level of assistance" decision-making stage. We do so for two related reasons. First, this is the area in which Cingranelli and Pasquarello found their strongest relationship, and thus their results in this area stand in clearest contradiction to the bulk of existing work on the issue. Second, our concern with the selection of cases dealt particularly with the analysis of economic rather than military assistance.
Before we precede, it is important to note that Cingranelli and Pasquarello did not use total U.S. economic aid as their dependent variable. Rather, they utilized a subset consisting of general AID Development Assistance, Economic Support Funds, and P.L. 480-Title 1 commodity credits. These programs represent the majority of funds given to the Latin American and Caribbean nations, but do exclude P.L. 480-Title 2, Peace Corps, and International Narcotics control funds, as well as those funds that fall into the inevitable "other" category. No rationale is given for choosing these particular programs for inclusion, but it is reasonable to assume that Cingranelli and Pasquarello felt it best to focus on those forms of assistance that were (1) clearly economic in nature and (2) distributed directly by the United States.
The Peace Corps and International Narcotics control, especially the latter, while clearly nonmilitary forms of assistance, do not represent what most people intuitively have in mind as economic assistance either. And P.L. 480-Title 2 funds are distributed via multilateral agencies, whereas Title 1 funds are distributed by the U.S. bilaterally. Presumably, these facts led Cingranelli and Pasquarello to exclude these categories from their measure of economic assistance. This rationale is reasonable and certainly has some validity. On the other hand, we can think of several plausible reasons to dismiss this rationale as well. First, the human rights legislation that ties aid distribution to rights behavior does not single out particular categories of economic assistance. Second, it is not clear that U.S. decision makers, particularly toward the top of the bureaucracy, actually distinguish among these categories of aid when formulating decisions. And, finally, as with the excluded categories, one can raise questions about the true nature of several of the included categories. The bulk of Economic Support Funds, for instance, is comprised of Supplementary Security Assistance, aid which we can reasonably argue belongs under the heading of military rather than economic assistance. The point, simply, is that it is not clear to us that there is a definitively "correct" answer to the question of what does and does not constitute economic assistance. As a result, we are uncomfortable excluding any categories of aid that are officially labeled economic, and we shall, therefore, estimate two sets of equations, one utilizing Cingranelli and Pasquarello's measure of economic assistance, and one utilizing total economic assistance.9
We shall utilize five different measures of human rights behavior. First, of course, we shall use Cingranelli and Pasquarello's measure of overall human rights. In addition, we shall also replicate all equations with our State Department-based and Amnesty International-based scales, as well as with the Freedom House political and civil rights scales. This will allow us to compare scales derived in different manners and, more important, from different sources of information.
As noted above, we shall also estimate each equation with different sets of cases: once with all of those cases that received some economic aid, once with just El Salvador excluded, and once with all of the nonroutine cases excluded.
In sum, we shall examine the relationship between economic assistance and human rights looking at (1) two measures of economic data, (2) five measures of human rights, and (3) three sets of cases. We shall, in other words, present many replications or variations on the basic theme and hope to do so in a reasonably clear fashion. The full set of regression estimates are presented in Table 3.1o 9The two sets of economic data provide for a different N. Remember that we are dealing with only those countries that successfully passed through the gatekeeping stage, or received at least some funding. With Cingranelli and Pasquarello's data set, there are thus 14 cases available for analysis, and with total aid there are 22 (see Appendix 1).
'?We have obviously employed regression techniques in this analysis, but we do so with reservations. We feel that Cingranelli and Pasquarello utilized regression on a sample with far too few cases. The equations they estimated for the level of economic assistance stage of the research were based on only 14 cases. Moreover, with this extremely small 
NOTES: aNumber in parentheses = N. = Significant at the .05 level or better.
sample, they introduced up to four independent variables. As a result, all of their findings (as well as ours below) must be considered suspect. Even when the sample is enlarged somewhat by using total economic assistance, regression is an inappropriate form of analysis. We utilize regression, nevertheless, only so that we may compare the results with those of Cingranelli and Pasquarello. mated by Cingranelli and Pasquarello." The results are virtually identical (28.2 vs. 28.3) and are statistically significant.'2 What we now wish to do is to examine how this estimate changes when we employ different measures of economic aid and human rights, and different sets of cases. It appears that using different compilations of economic assistance has little effect on the results. The basic relationships among the estimates are very similar across the two sets of economic data, but, of course, there was no way of knowing this before conducting the analysis.
Important differences are apparent, however, across different measures of human rights and different sets of cases. Only those human rights measures based on State Department information produce any significant results.'3 Even when the other aspects of Cingranelli and Pasquarello's analysis are held constant (we employ their economic data and exclude only El Salvador, i.e., row 2) none of the non-State Department-derived measures produce significant results. The different realities depicted by these competing scales, in other words, do produce significantly different results. Unless one is prepared to defend the State Department information as more objective or "correct" than other sources, and/or as the only important source of human rights information utilized by decision makers, it is difficult to accept the results derived with these scales as a more accurate reflection of the relationship between aid and rights (the same, of course, is true of the other scales as well).
The differences evident across the various sets of cases are also important. If other factors are held constant, a choice to exclude only El Salvador is far more likely to produce a relatively large and significant slope than either including or excluding all of the nonroutine " Here, we examine only the bivariate relationship between human rights and economic aid. Cingranelli and Pasquarello examined a variety of alternative independent variables as well, although the final equation they present (in scattergram form) depicts only the bivariate relationship. While it is possible that entering controls would result in higher parameter estimates for the human rights variable, the far more likely outcome is that they would be even smaller. Given the small number of cases available for analysis, it thus seemed unwise to enter additional regressors.
"2As before, the signs for the non-Cingranelli and Pasquarello measures of human rights have been reversed so as to avoid unnecessary confusion (see fn. 7).
'3It is important to recognize the unreliability of t-tests on such a small sample. The computation of t is always dependent upon s, which of course varies from sample to sample. Thus, an assumption of t is that the sample distribution is normal, an assumption that becomes increasingly tenuous as N is reduced. As a result, "probabilities obtained in this manner can be misleading whenever N is relatively small" (Blalock, 1979, p. 190) . Throughout, therefore, all references to statistical significance should be taken with a certain measure of reservation.
cases. Confining ourselves to the State Department scales, or columns 1 and 2, we can see that in three of the four combinations of human rights measures and economic data, the set of cases which excludes only El Salvador is the only one which produces significant results (col. 1, row 3, being the lone exception). Treating the nonroutine cases in a consistent manner causes the relationship to drop out. In fairness, when Cingranelli and Pasquarello's human rights and economic data are employed, excluding all of the nonroutine cases does produce a statistically significant result (col. 1, row 3). Even in this instance, however, excluding all of the nonroutine cases does reduce the slope substantially (from 28.2 to 16.7, a decline of 41 percent). In short, even with State Department-based measures, a consistent treatment of outliers produces much less dramatic results than those discovered by Cingranelli and Pasquarello.
In sum, this brief reanalysis indicates that Cingranelli and Pasquarello's results regarding the relationship between human rights and the level of economic assistance exhibit questionable validity or robustness. The information upon which their human rights measure is based is of suspect political objectivity, and, more important, competing measures produce significantly different results. Similarly, the wisdom of excluding only El Salvador from the analysis can be reasonably questioned, and again, different (and we believe more defensible) sets of cases produce substantially different results.
Conclusion
The point of this simple reanalysis is to highlight the fact that the results arrived at by Cingranelli and Pasquarello are achieved only under restrictive (and, we feel, somewhat dubious) circumstances. Overall, the reanalysis leads to the conclusion that in order to find a significant positive relationship between the level of economic aid and human rights, one must utilize both a State Department-based measure of human rights and a set of cases which excludes only the nonroutine case of El Salvador."4 With few exceptions (in fact, only one), utilizing human rights measures derived from different sources, or using slightly different sets of cases, or a slightly different set of economic data, produces substantially different results. Given this lack of robustness, the validity of Cingranelli and Pasquarello's results seems highly questionable.
Some may argue that this conclusion raises severe doubts about the usefulness of statistical analyses of human rights in general. If slight variations in sources and cases produce contradictory results, what is the point of conducting such analyses at all? We feel that such a position is unwarranted. While there are clearly instances in which nonstatistical approaches are more useful for the study of human rights, it seems equally clear that there are instances in which a statistical approach is quite appropriate and useful. It is necessary, however, to utilize careful judgment. In instances where there is only weak theoretical basis for choosing among sets of cases, data, and information sources, alternatives need to be examined side by side. Otherwise, we can have little confidence in results.
Finally, what does this reanalysis tell us about the link between economic aid and human rights? Given its brevity and simplicity, in itself it certainly does not provide definitive proof that human rights have little effect on the distribution of U.S. economic aid; alone, it provides only prima facie evidence for this conclusion. The real point, however, is that there already exists a very substantial body of work, utilizing a variety of approaches and examining very different sets of cases, which almost uniformly points to the conclusion that human rights plays little or no role in U.S. foreign assistance decision making (again, see Chomsky, 1978; Schoultz, 198 la, 198 lb; Falk, 1981; Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson, 1984; Stohl, 1985, 1986) . The significance of Cingranelli and Pasquarello's results was that they contradicted this body of work.'5 Our reanalysis has simply shown the weakness of this challenge. In short, Cingranelli and Pasquarello provide little basis for seriously questioning or altering the basic conclusion of the clear majority of work in the field: there is no evidence that the United States distributes its foreign assistance with significant regard to the human rights behavior of recipient nations. 
